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WHEN EVEN THE TRUTH ISN'T GOOD
ENOUGH: JUDICIAL INCONSISTENCY IN
FALSE LIGHT CASES THREATENS FREE
SPEECH
BY SANDRA F. CHANCE* & CHRISTINA M. LOCKE"
Journalists are taught that truthful reporting is the best defense
to a lawsuit. However, Florida journalists who reported the truth lost a
staggering $18-million false light invasion of privacy lawsuit. The
verdict was ultimately overturned by the Florida Supreme Court, which
repudiated the tort as duplicative of libel law without the First
Amendment protections. However, an appellate court in Missouri
specifically recognized the tort in a case involving technology and the
Internet within two months of the Florida decision. Using the most recent
appellate false light cases, the Article examines the potential for false
light to stifle the media, especially when truthful news content is
targeted This article concludes that the tort offalse light is inconsistent
with First Amendment values and historic protections for journalists and
must not be used to make an end-run around the First Amendment.
In 1988, an Oklahoma jury found Ronald Williamson and
Dennis Fritz guilty of rape and murder, a conviction that was later
overturned.' More than 20 years later, their story was the subject of a
lawsuit alleging, among other claims, false light invasion of privacy.2
The prosecutor and law enforcement officials involved in the initial
* McClatchy Professor of Freedom of Information at the University of Florida
College of Journalism and Communications and Executive Director of the Brechner
Center for Freedom of Information. Member, State Bar of Florida.
** Joseph L. and Marion 1. Brechner Research Fellow, University of Florida.
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 725 (10th Cir. 2010). Williamson and
Fritz spent more than a decade in jail before being exonerated. They were convicted
of a 1982 rape and murder based primarily on hair samples, jailhouse informant
testimony, and Williamson's statement to police that he had a dream in which he
committed the murder. In 1999, DNA testing showed that neither Williamson nor
Fritz could have contributed the hair or semen samples found at the crime scene. Id.
2. Id. at 727.
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conviction sued author John Grisham, alleging that his novel THE
INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN3 defamed
them and portrayed them in a false light.4 False light invasion of privacy
is a relatively new common law tort in many states that allows
individuals aggrieved of their "right to be let alone" to sue. Oklahoma
recognizes false light, but in 2010, a court held that Grisham could not be
sued for false light because there was not a sufficient nexus between the
plaintiffs allegations of harm and Grisham's assessment of the criminal
justice system as one riddled with "bad police work, junk science, faulty
eyewitness identifications, bad defense lawyers, lazy prosecutors, [and]
arrogant prosecutors."5
While Oklahoma follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
its definition of false light, several states have outright rejected the tort
on grounds that it violates the First Amendment. Since its inception, the
tort has drawn criticism by Dean William Prosser in 19607 and
subsequent analysis by various state supreme courts.8 On one hand, the
law provides a separate redress for injuries to one's right of privacy,
which is theoretically distinct from reputational harm.9 But on the other
hand, false light can be duplicative of defamation and unnecessarily chill
speech.10 For example, what if a newspaper truthfully reports a story
about a man accidentally shooting his wife, but he alleges the
3. JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL
TOWN (Doubleday 2006).
4. Id. Other defendants in the suit were Fritz himself (he wrote a book about
his ordeal), Barry Scheck (anti-death penalty advocate who devoted a chapter in his
2003 book Actual Innocence to the story) (BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE
(Doubleday 2000)), Robert Mayer (author of Dreams ofAda, a book about a similar
case involving the same prosecutor and investigator) (ROBERT MAYER, DREAMS OF
ADA (Broadway Books 1987)), and their publishers. Grisham's 2006 book, The
Innocent Man, recounted Williamson's life story. Id. at 726.
5. Id. (quoting JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE
IN A SMALL TOWN 380 (Doubleday 2006)).
6. Id. at 730; see infra note 70.
7. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 398-401 (1960).
8. See infra note 70.
9. For a general overview of false light, see KENT R. MIDDLETON, WILLIAM E.
LEE & BILL F. CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 207-14 (6th ed.
2004).
10. Id.
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arrangement of sentences falsely portrayed him as a murderer?" In a
later-overturned Florida jury verdict, a businessman was awarded $18.28
million for a newspaper's truthful coverage of his wife's death.1 Had
Florida not rejected false light as a cause of action, that verdict could still
stand today. It is this type of false light scenario that illustrates how
dangerous the tort can be for the press.
A brief comparison of false light and defamation is helpful in
understanding the controversy surrounding the adoption of false light.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the type of statement
communicated in a successful false light action is "highly offensive to a
reasonable person."' 3 In a defamation action, the statement must be
"false and defamatory." 14 False light is said to protect individual privacy
and mental distress while defamation protects reputation.
Defamation allows for variable standards of fault on the part of
the publisher depending upon the status of the plaintiff. For example, in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that public
official plaintiffs must prove "actual malice" on the part of the defendant
in order to protect the First Amendment rights of the media.15 The Court
expounded on this concept in Gertz v. Welch, deciding that a variable
11. Florida businessman Joe Anderson, Jr. sued the Pensacola News Journal
for false light invasion of privacy based on a 1998 article on Anderson's political
clout that also addressed his wife's 1988 death. Gannett Co. v. Anderson (Anderson
1), 947 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd, 994 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2008).
Anderson apparently shot his wife in what law enforcement officials deemed a
hunting accident. Id. at 2-3. Anderson admitted that the News Journal's story was
factually correct but alleged that the story gave the false impression that he had
murdered his wife. Id. at 3. Anderson's suit, filed March 21, 2001, alleged
defamation, but he missed the 2-year statute of limitations for defamation. Id. at 2.
He then amended the suit to add a false light count, which the trial court found to fall
within Florida's 4-year limit for "unspecified torts." Id. at 2. "[A] jury awarded
[Anderson] $18.28 million in compensatory damages." Id. Florida's First District
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, applying the 2-year statute of
limitations. Id. See also Anderson v. Gannett Co. (Anderson II), 994 So. 2d 1048,
1051 (Fla. 2008) (declining to address whether the 2- or 4-year statute of limitations
applied based on its decision in a companion case rejecting the false light cause of
action).
12. Anderson 1, 947 So. 2d at 2.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
14. Id. at § 558 (1977).
15. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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fault standard - such as only requiring proof of negligence where the
subject of the alleged defamatory statement is a private figure - was
within the confines of the First Amendment.' 6
While the Restatement definition of false light includes an actual
malice standard (requiring proof that the defendant "had knowledge of or
acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and
the false light in which the other would be placed"),17 the Supreme Court
in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing specifically declined to address
whether a variable fault standard in false light cases would pass
constitutional muster.' 8 Prior to Cantrell, the Supreme Court had already
considered its first false light case in Time, Inc. v. Hill, where it
recognized false light but required an actual malice fault requirement for
matters of public interest.19
Cantrell and Hill have been the only discussions of false light
invasion of privacy by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, as consistent
court attention to defamation has resulted in an erosion of that tort,
litigants have increasingly turned to false light.20 For example, false light
has appeared in published opinions 60 times more often from 2000-2010
16. 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974) (holding that "a newspaper or broadcaster that
publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official
nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury
inflicted").
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
18. 419 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974) ("[T]his case presents no occasion to consider
whether a State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual under a
false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or whether the constitutional standard
announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light cases."). Cantrell was
decided approximately six months after the Court's decision in Gertz.
19. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (holding that the
constitutional protections for speech and press precluded "the application of the New
York statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of
proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth"). The Hill case involved the fictionalization of the
kidnapping ordeal of the Hill family. Id. at 378. The Hills sued Life magazine for
invasion of privacy after an article about the incident (and about a new play based on
the hostage-taking) portrayed their experience as being much worse than it actually
was. Id.
20. James B. Lake, Restraining False Light: Constitutional and Common Law
Limits on a "Troublesome Tort", 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 625, 626 (2008).
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than in the 1960s.2 The 2000-2010 decade saw nearly twice as many
false light-related opinions as the 1990s (1,025 versus 1,982). 22 And
within the most recent decade, the number of opinions mentioning false
light doubled with 123 in 2000 and 312 in 2010.23
In light of the significant increase in false light issues faced by
the courts (and the press), this Article addresses the past, present, and
future of the false light invasion of privacy tort, looking at its inception
in a law review article, current adoption by a majority of states, and the
potential for a widespread, negative effect if truthful reporting continues
to be subject to false light lawsuits. Part I examines the evolution of false
light from the recognition of a right of privacy in a law review article24
through state court adoptions of the four privacy torts - appropriation,
intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light - following
21
their inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Part II assesses the
current state of false light law by presenting the landscape of the law
across the nation with a focus on three recent appellate decisions that
present both sides of the controversy. The danger for truthful reporting
and the existence of other appropriate remedies are discussed in further
detail in Part III. Finally, Part IV concludes that although the majority of
states have adopted false light, the story does not end there - recent
cases illustrate the danger of recognizing false light for truthful
21. This figure was arrived at by searching the "Federal and State Cases
Combined" database provided by LexisNexis using the Boolean search term "false
light" between January 1, 1960, and January 1, 1970, and comparing that result (33)
to the results of the same search but with date restrictions of January 1, 2000, to
January 1, 2010 (1,982). Thus, there has been a large increase in the mention of
false light in published opinions. One could reasonably infer that such a large
increase in references to the claim might correlate with an increase in such claims.
However, the authors recognize that this does not mean that the number of false light
claims has increased 60-fold since the 1960s, and a calculation of the actual number
of false light claims is beyond the scope of this article.
22. Using the Boolean search term "false light", the "Federal and State Cases
Combined" LexisNexis database was searched using the date restrictions of January
1, 1990, to January 1, 2000, and January 1, 2000, to January 1, 2010.
23. Using the Boolean search term "false light" the "Federal and State Cases
Combined" LexisNexis database was searched using the date restrictions of January
1, 2000, to January 1, 2001, and so on for the 2000-2010 decade.
24. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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reportage. Those states still undecided about adopting the tort, as well as
those who have already given their blessing to the false light cause of
action, must take into account the hazards posed by false light or else
protected speech will be needlessly silenced.
I. PROSSER'S PRIVACY POSTULATE: FALSE LIGHT IS BORN
The common law invasion of privacy torts stem from the seminal
26
work by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy. The
article, published in an 1890 issue of Harvard Law Review, was a
reaction to the "yellow journalism" of the time and the extreme tactics
27journalists used to write sensational stories. In particular, the press had
28
a "field day" with the wedding of Warren's daughter. In their article,
published shortly after the wedding, Warren and Brandeis proposed a
new principle upon which aggrieved individuals could seek relief: the
right to privacy. The authors contended this "right to be let alone" offers
individuals protection against mental distress caused by the excessive
29prying of the press. For several decades after the article was first
published, legal scholars continued to debate whether a right of privacy
even existed.30 However, since the 1930s and the publication of the first
Restatement of Torts, the majority of American courts have recognized a
right of privacy in some form.31
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24.
27. Prosser, supra note 7, at 383. Prosser described it as "the era of 'yellow
journalism,' when the press had begun to resort to excesses in the way of prying ...
." Id.
28. Id.
29. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24.
30. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 7, at 386-87 (discussing how the recognition
of a right to privacy varies from state to state).
31. Id. But cf, Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 328 (1966). Kalven opines that
fascination with the great Brandeis trade mark, [sic]
excitement over the law at a point of growth, and appreciation
of privacy as a key value have combined to dull the normal
critical senses of judges and commentators and have caused
them not to see the pettiness of the tort they have sponsored.
Id.
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This trend toward the recognition of privacy rights was well-
established in 1960, when William Prosser, Dean of the University of
California at Berkeley Law School, wrote a law review article that
examined case law since Warren and Brandeis first articulated a right to
privacy.32 Prosser set forth four distinct invasion of privacy torts based
on his interpretation of cases since 1890:
Intrusion
Public disclosure of private facts
False light in the public eye
Appropriation 34
This classification of invasion of privacy torts was adopted in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, for which Prosser was a reporter.3 3 As
one court aptly stated:
The law relating to a protectable "right to privacy"
is an American invention, developing over a period
of approximately the last one hundred years. The
law in its present form was conceived almost
entirely by Professor William Prosser, who, in a
1960 law review article in the California Law
Review, expounded that the right of privacy gave
rise not to one but to four different tort actions,
sometimes called "Prosser's Four Torts of
Privacy."
These four torts found their way into the
Restatement - perhaps because Prosser was the
American Law Institute Reporter who drafted the
language - and have been adopted, often
verbatim, by the vast majority of American
.34jurisdictions.
False light, Prosser admitted, was not an invasion of privacy tort
envisioned by Warren and Brandeis.35 Prosser recognized the overlap
32. Prosser, supra note 7, at 389.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); see infra note 35
(Prosser was the American Law Institute Reporter who drafted the language.).
34. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895
P.2d 1269, 1277-78 (Nev. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
35. Prosser, supra note 7, at 398.
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between defamation and false light, noting that both claims will often lie
in one case.36 He described false light as "a needed remedy" that goes
beyond the narrow confines of defamation." Prosser concluded his
discussion of false light with a series of questions rather than answers:
Would false light engulf the law of defamation? If so, how valuable are
the restrictions imposed on defamation claims in the name of a free
press? 38
It has been argued that courts accepted Prosser's articulation of
false light and its subsequent inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts with few attempts to rationalize or justify the existence of the
tort. 3 9 Legal commentators have, however, scrutinized the rationale
behind false light, and many have concluded courts should not recognize
the tort. The major arguments levied against recognition of the false light
invasion of privacy tort are that it is in tension with the constitutional
guarantees of free speech, is duplicative of defamation, and contributes
to judicial inefficiency.
Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman argues that false light's
chilling effect on speech renders the tort "unworkable" and
36. Prosser, supra note 7, at 400.
37. Prosser, supra note 7, at 401.
38. Id. Prosser stated:
It is here, however, that one disposed to alarm might express
the greatest concern over where privacy may be going. The
question may well be raised, and apparently still is
unanswered, whether this branch of the tort is not capable of
swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public
defamation; and whether there is any false libel printed, for
example, in a newspaper, which cannot be redressed upon the
alternative ground. If that turns out to be the case, it may well
be asked, what of the numerous restrictions and limitations
which have hedged defamation about for many years, in the
interest of freedom of the press and the discouragement of
trivial and extortionate claims? Are they of so little
consequence that they may be circumvented in so casual and
cavalier a fashion?
Id.
39. See, e.g., Harvey L. Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy - Some
Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 253, 255
(1990) (arguing that the tort of false light is unlikely to survive if not adequately
rationalized).
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"conceptually empty.',40 The analogy of false light to defamation is
misleading. 41 False light includes a wider class of speech than
defamation, especially statements that are false but do not harm the
42plaintiffs reputation. Further, false light has few of the common law
restrictions that limit defamation claims.43 Therefore, false light does not
rationally fit into our constitutional scheme, which offers great
protections for most speech." Zimmerman also argues that falsehoods
have "affirmative value as speech" because they promote the search for
truth.45
In his 1992 article, Professor J. Clark Kelso noted the judicial
reliance on Prosser's reputation as a leading torts scholar by analyzing
false light cases reported after Prosser's article was published.46 Kelso
found more than 600 cases mentioning false light and privacy but could
not find "a single good case in which false light can be clearly identified
as adding anything distinctive to the law."47 Kelso concluded that false
light does not deserve independent recognition as a tort because even the
two cases where false light was the sole, non-overlapping cause of action
could have been treated as libel or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.48 "Unfortunately, the mere act of repeatedly quoting the
Restatement or Prosser tends to bring an aura of reality to false light
privacy," Kelso wrote.49
40. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light
that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 369-70 (1989) (noting that the distinctions
between the torts of defamation and false light do not support analogizing
defamation in order to find a rationale for false light). See also Patricia Avidan,
Protecting the Media's First Amendment Rights in Florida: Making False Light
Plaintifs Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STETSON L. REV. 227 (2005) (arguing that
the overlap between false light and defamation require courts to be vigilant in
distinguishing the two in order to protect the First Amendment rights of the media).
41. Id., supra note 40, at 393.
42. Id. at 394.
43. Id. at 394.
44. Zimmerman, supra note 40, at 395.
45. Id. at 404-05.
46. J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
783 (1992).
47. Id. at 785.
48. Id. at 886-87.
49. Id at 825.
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Some authors argue that the tort should remain viable but with
certain limitations. Professor Gary Schwartz proposes limiting the tort to
cases where it does not overlap with defamation and even then requiring
an actual malice standard of liability.5 o False statements that do not harm
one's reputation but are highly offensive include: false claims about
plaintiffs' private lives; false claims about very personal thoughts or
emotions of plaintiffs; false statements that portray plaintiffs as being
severely victimized (i.e., suffering from a serious illness or being
kidnapped); and statements that attribute virtues to plaintiffs that are
unearned.
Media attorney Steven Zansberg advocates the approach of
courts that refuse to recognize false light claims if the publication
focuses on issues of legitimate public concern.52 Examples of scenarios
that would not be actionable under a theory of false light invasion of
privacy are: public officials who wish to sue based on publication in
connection with their public duties, public or private figures who wish to
sue based on reports of their "public personae," and businesspersons who
want to sue based on publication regarding their professional conduct.
James B. Lake, also a media attorney, argues that existing limits
on the defamation tort (such as Internet service provider immunity, pre-
suit notice, and the "wire service defense") "ought to apply to . . .
alternative torts, such as false light, insofar as they involve defamatory
falsehoods."5 4 Lake also suggests several legal tactics that can be
50. Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light
Invasion ofPrivacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 885 (1991).
51. Id. at 893-96.
52. Steven D. Zansberg, Reducing the Glare of False Light: Why the Tort
Should be Limited to Personal Information Unrelated to Professional Conduct, 24
COMM. LAW. 11 (2006).
53. Id. at 13.
54. Lake, supra note 20, at 627. Lake notes the well-established body of law in
the area of defamation:
Courts and legislatures have spent decades developing intricate
rules that govern claims for defamation. Given this well-
established jurisprudence, "there is nothing to be gained from
taking a problem easily solvable under the traditional rules of
defamation and shunting it over to the murky recesses of other
torts." In fact, not only is nothing to be gained, but much is to
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invoked in order to challenge false light claims that accompany
defamation claims.
Despite convincing arguments against the recognition of false
light, some authors contend that the tort should be recognized as a cause
of action distinct from defamation. The personal dignity interest served
by false light is just as important as the reputational interest served by
defamation, according to one author, and thus the cause of action should
be available to the aggrieved plaintiff who suffered mental distress but
56
not reputational harm. Another student author argued that false light
claims can actually promote First Amendment values by encouraging
public debate and can protect self-determination.5 7 Privacy protections
also promote independent thinking and government participation without
fear of unwanted publicity.5 8 Policy considerations such as the ability for
advanced technology to infringe on individual privacy also support the
59
existence of a false light tort.
Scholarly analysis of the arguments for and against recognition
of the false light tort have been echoed in the opinions of many state
supreme courts as they grappled with the decision of whether to accept
the relatively new, controversial, and sometimes puzzling cause of
action. These opinions, as well as the current legal landscape of false
light law, are discussed in Part II.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE: TRENDS IN FALSE LIGHT
JURISPRUDENCE
This part presents an overview of state treatment of the false
light tort. It uses the two most recent appellate cases directly considering
be lost if the well-established speech-protecting rules of
defamation law are evaded.
Id., supra note 20, at 650 (quoting R. Bruce Rich & Livia D. Brilliant, Defamation-
in-Fiction: The Limited Viability ofAlternative Causes ofAction, 52 BROOK L. REV.
1,41 (1986)).
55. Id. at 648-50.
56. Bryan R. Lasswell, Note, In Defense ofFalse Light: Why False Light Must
Remain a Viable Cause ofAction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 179 (1993).
57. Nathan E. Ray, Note, Let There Be False Light: Resisting the Growing
TrendAgainst an Important Tort, 84 MINN. L. REv. 713 (2000).
58. Id. at 744.
59. Id. at 743-44.
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the merits of false light - Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp and Meyerkord
v. Zipatoni Co. - to illustrate the current debate over whether false
light should be recognized as a cause of action separate from defamation.
This part also discusses Anderson v. Gannett Co., 62 a companion case to
Rapp, whose facts go to the heart of the very real danger for jurisdictions
that recognize false light.
A. State Approaches to False Light
Thirty-one states have accepted false light as a viable cause of
action. A few of these states distinguish between public and private
60. 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008).
61. 276 S.W.3d 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
62. 994 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2008).
63. These states are: Alabama (Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826 (Ala. 1994));
Arizona (Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1989));
Arkansas (Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 1979)); California
(Fellows v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986)); Connecticut (Goodrich v.
Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982)); Delaware
(Price v. Chaffinch, No. 04-956, 2006, WL 1313178 (D. Del. May 12, 2006));
Georgia (Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. 1966)); Hawaii (Chung v.
McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co., 128 P.3d 833, 847 (Haw. 2006)); Idaho (Baker v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978)); Illinois (Leopold v. Levin,
259 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1970)); Indiana (Near East Side Cmty. Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d
1324 (Ind. App. 1990)); Iowa (Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 1977));
Kansas (Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1975)); Kentucky (McCall v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky.1981)); Louisiana
(Perere v. La. Television Broad. Corp., 721 So. 2d 1075 (La. App. 1998)); Maine
(Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 795 (Me. 1976)); Maryland (Harnish
v. Herald-Mail Co., 286 A.2d 146 (Md. 1972)); Michigan (Deitz v. Wometco West
Mich. TV, 407 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1987)); Missouri (Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co.,
276 S.W.3d 319 (Mo. 2008)); Montana (Lence v. Hagadone Inv. Co., 853 P.2d 1230
(Mont. 1993)); Nebraska (NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-204 (2009)); New Jersey (Romaine
v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284 (N.J. 1988)); New Mexico (Moore v. Sun Publ'g Corp.,
881 P.2d 735 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)); Ohio (Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051
(Ohio 2007)); Oklahoma (McCormack v. Okla. Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla.
1980)); Pennsylvania (Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1(a)(4) (2009));
Tennessee (West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn. 2001));
Utah (Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992));
Washington (Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 722 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1986)); and
West Virginia (Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1983)).
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plaintiffs, similar to the lesser burden of proof for private defamation
plaintiffs established in Gertz v. Welch. For example, Arizona does not
allow public officials to sue for false light if the statement is related to
their public duties.65 Delaware,66 Indiana,67 and Maryland68 do not
permit false light suits where the statement at issue is a matter of public
concern.
The Supreme Court in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing left
open the question of whether variable fault standards in false light suits
are constitutional under the First Amendment. Perhaps as the number
of decisions related to false light increase, so too will the chance that the
64. In Gertz v. Welch, the U.S. Supreme Court permitted a variable fault
standard in defamation claims but specifically declined to address whether such a
variable standard would be constitutional for false light claims:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. This
approach provides a more equitable boundary between the
competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength
of the legitimate state interest in compensating private
individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the
press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for
defamation. At least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the
substance of the defamatory statement "makes substantial
danger to reputation apparent." This phrase places in
perspective the conclusion we announce today. Our inquiry
would involve considerations somewhat different from those
discussed above if a State purported to condition civil liability
on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a
reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory
potential. Cf Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Such a
case is not now before us, and we intimate no view as to its
proper resolution.
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) (quoting Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
65. Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 789.
66. Price, 2006 WL 1313178, at *7.
67. Hair, 555 N.E.2d at 1355.
68. Harnish, 286 A.2d at 146.
69. 419 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974).
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Court will answer whether such a variable fault standard is constitutional
in false light claims.
Ten states have specifically rejected false light.7 0 Tensions
between the First Amendment and tort law were at the heart of most of
these decisions. The Colorado Supreme Court called false light "too
amorphous a tort" that "risks inflicting an unacceptable chill on those in
the media seeking to avoid liability." 7 1 Minnesota's Supreme Court held
that "to the extent that false light is more expansive than defamation,
tension between this tort and the First Amendment is increased." 72
Judicial inefficiency was a concern for North Carolina's Supreme Court,
which thought false light "would reduce judicial efficiency by requiring
our courts to consider two claims for the same relief [defamation and
false light] which, if not identical, would not differ significantly."" False
light's duplication of defamation and lack of the procedural safeguards
found in defamation law "unacceptably increase[s] the tension that
already exists between free speech constitutional guarantees and tort
law," according to the Texas Supreme Court.74
Five of the remaining states mention false light in a general
sense but do not specifically address the tort. North Dakota76 and
70. The states that have rejected false light are: Alaska (Luedtke v. Nabors
Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989)); Colorado (Denver Publ'g Co.
v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893 (Colo. 2002)); Florida (Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So.
2d 1098 (Fla. 2008)); Massachusetts (ELM Med. Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532
N.E.2d 675 (Mass. 1989)); Minnesota (Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d
231 (Minn. 1998)); New York (Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y.
1993)); North Carolina (Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405
(N.C. 1984)); Texas (Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994)); Virginia
(Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981) and WJLA-TV
v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383 (Va. 2002)); and Wisconsin (Zinda v. La. Pac. Corp., 440
N.W. 2d 548 (Wis. 1989) and Wis. STAT. § 995.50 (2010) (recognizing three types
of invasion of privacy, but not false light)).
71. Bueno, 54 P.3d at 904.
72. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235.
73. Renwick, 312 S.E.2d at 413.
74. Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 580.
75. These states are: North Dakota (Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574
N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1998)); Nevada (People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995)); Wyoming (Wells v. State, 846
P.2d 589 (Wyo. 1992)); Vermont (Lemnah v. Am. Breeders Serv., Inc., 482 A.2d
700 (Vt. 1984)); and South Dakota (Truxes v. Kenco Enters., Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914
(S.D. 1963)).
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Vermont,77 for example, are states where it is still unclear whether
common law invasion of privacy is recognized. In Wyoming, while the
state supreme court has restated Prosser's four invasion of privacy torts
in a general sense, it has not directly addressed false light as a viable
cause of action. 8
Finally, four states discuss false light but specifically decline to
either reject or recognize false light. In these states, the high courts
have directly sidestepped the issue of whether they will recognize the
tort. As the Oregon Supreme Court put it: "This court previously has not
recognized the tort of invasion of privacy by false light . . . we need not
decide in this case whether to do so because, even if that tort is available
in Oregon, plaintiff has failed to allege it here.",s
Despite its acceptance by a majority of states, false light
"'remains the least-recognized and most controversial aspect of invasion
of privacy."' 8 1 The three most recent appellate decisions considering
whether to accept or reject false light illustrate the continuing debate
over the tort despite the acceptance by a majority of states. The first
decision, issued by the Florida Supreme Court in Fall 2008, considered a
Jewish woman's claim that a Jews for Jesus newsletter article alleging
her conversion to Christianity cast her in a false light.82
76. Hougum, 574 N.W.2d at 816.
77. Lemnah, 482 A.2d at 700.
78. Wells, 846 P.2d at 600 (Urbigkit, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
79. These states are: Mississippi (Cook v. Mardi Gras Casino Corp., 697 So.
2d 378 (Miss. 1997) and Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., 497 So. 2d 77
(Miss.1986)); New Hampshire (Thomas v. Telegraph Publ'g Co., 859 A.2d 1166 (N.
H. 2004)); Oregon (Reesman v. Highfill, 965 P.2d 1030 (Ore. 1998)); and South
Carolina (Parker v. Evening Post Publ'g Co., 452 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. 1994)).
80. Reesman, 965 P.2d at 1036. An Oregon appellate court had previously
recognized false light. Dean v. Guard Publ'g Co., 699 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985).
81. Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 898 (Colo. 2002) (quoting Cain
v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994)).
82. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008).
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B. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp
In Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, Jewish retiree Edith Rapp sued
her stepson after he reported in a Jews for Jesus, Inc. newsletter that
83Rapp had converted to Christianity. Rapp alleged that the newsletter
article cast her in a false light.84 The Florida Supreme Court emphatically
rejected false light as duplicative of defamation, concluding that "false
light is largely duplicative of existing torts, but without the attendant
protections of the First Amendment."8 5 The court did, however,
recognize defamation by implication as a cause of action.
83. Id. at 1100-01. See also Praise Report, JEWS FOR JEsus NEWSLETTER (Jews
for Jesus, San Francisco, Cal.), July 2002, at 5, available at
http://www.jewsforjesus.org/publications/newsletter/2002 07/praisereport
(recounting the alleged conversion of the Rapp plaintiff). Bruce Rapp reported he
"was afraid that [he] may not have another chance to be with" his father, who had
been ill, and during the visit, Edith Rapp began asking "questions about Jesus" and
converted to Christianity. Id. See also Court Favors Expression in Rejecting 'False
Light', TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 3, 2008, at 19, available at 2008 WLNR 21119657
(reporting the "victory for free speech and freedom of the press" the Rapp decision
represented).
84. Rapp, 997 So. 2d. at 1098.
85. Id. at 1100. The question certified to the Florida Supreme Court was:
"Does Florida recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, and if so, are the
elements of the tort set forth in section 652E of Restatement (Second) of Torts?" Id.
86. Florida law is not clear on defamation by implication. For example, a
LexisNexis keyword search of all Florida state cases for the term "defamation by
implication" turned up only the Rapp case. The Court in its opinion referred to a
Michigan Supreme Court case, Locricchio v. Evening News Association, 476
N.W.2d 112, 133-34 (Mich. 1991), which stated that defamation by implication
claims must carry the First Amendment protections that accompany libel. Rapp, 997
So. 2d. at 1108. However, neither the Loricchio nor Rapp court provides a clear
definition of what exactly constitutes defamation by implication. A detailed analysis
of defamation by implication is beyond the scope of this article, but it appears to be
an expansion of defamation that might also chill speech in Florida. See also C.
Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of
Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 237
(1993) (noting that "[e]ven when all the statements in a publication are factually
correct and, at least standing alone, are not defamatory, courts have treated the
publication as actionable under the rubric of 'implied libel' (citing Southern Air
Transp., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 877 F.2d 1010, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1989)));
Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing
defamation by implication).
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Prior to Rapp, the Florida Supreme Court had made mention of
false light by way of "acknowledg[ing] Prosser's paradigm of the four
general categories of invasion of privacy, one of which is a cause of
action for false light. Noting the absence of either a statutory
prohibition against or case law recognizing false light, the court
examined the policy concerns surrounding the adoption of the tort.8 The
court focused on false light's similarities to defamation and "the potential
to chill speech without any appreciable benefit to society."89
The court addressed the concern that false light "allows recovery
for literally true statements that create a false impression." 90 For
example, a Florida case involved a newscast that juxtaposed an interview
of a man's ex-wife along with stories and photos of women who had
been killed by their partners. 91 The man sued, alleging that while the
facts broadcast about him were true, the newscast created the false
impression that he was an abusive spouse.92 The Restatement example is
that of a cab driver whose photo is used with a news story about drivers
who manipulate fares.9 3 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that
defamation by implication, "a well-recognized species of defamation that
is subsumed within the tort of defamation," offered adequate protection
in cases such as these. 94 Despite the Court's characterization of
defamation by implication as well recognized, a legal database search of
all Florida cases (state and federal) for the term "defamation by
implication" prior to the Rapp decision yielded zero cases.
87. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1103 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d
156, 160-61 (Fla. 2003) and Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of
Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1252 n.20 (Fla. 1996)).
88. Id. at 1104-05.
89. Id at 1105.
90. Id. at 1106 (citing Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781,
787 (Ariz. 1989)).
91. Heekin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 789 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
92. Id
93. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1106 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652E cmt. b). See also Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948)
(finding the use of a taxi cab driver's photograph in a satirical news article about cab
drivers sufficient to sustain libel and right to privacy claims).
94. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1108.
95. The authors searched the "FL Federal & State Cases Combined"
LexisNexis database for the Boolean term "defamation by implication."
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The Florida Supreme Court also raised concerns about the First
Amendment implications of false light, noting that additions to the false
light invasion of privacy tort would "'take[] from the field of free
debate. Citing the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Bueno,
Florida's high court took issue with the "highly offensive to a reasonable
person" standard, fearing that its ambiguity would chill free speech. 9 7
The Bueno court honed in on the difficulty the media would have in
determining what would be highly offensive: "'[D]efamation is measured
by its results; whereas false light invasion of privacy is measured by
perception."' 98 The Rapp court also worried that the safeguards built into
Florida defamation actions - privilege, statutory notice, and damage
limits - might be circumvented by false light actions. 99
Based on its concerns for the First Amendment and confidence
that defamation by implication would provide redress for plaintiffs who
took issue with factually true yet still disparaging statements, the Florida
100Supreme Court rejected the tort of false light invasion of privacy. At
the same time Rapp was decided, the Florida Supreme Court issued its
decision in the companion case - one more troubling for the media -
Anderson v. Gannett Co. 01
C. Anderson v. Gannett Co.
Businessman Joe Anderson, Jr. sued the Pensacola News
Journal for defamation over a series of stories about his political
connections and involvement in federal grand jury investigations.102 One
article, published in December 1998, recounted the death of Anderson's
96. Rapp, 997 So. 2d at 1110 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 272 (1964)).
97. Id. at 1110-11.
98. Id. at 1111 (quoting Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 903 (Colo.
2002)).
99. Id. atl1112-13.
100. Id. at 1115.
101. Anderson v. Gannett Co. (Anderson 1l), 994 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 2008)
(rejecting false light as a valid cause of action in a case where a man sued a
newspaper, alleging that an article implied that he killed his wife). See Gannett Co.
v. Anderson (Anderson 1), 947 So. 2d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
102. Anderson I, 947 So. 2d at 2.
wife a decade earlier.103 Anderson shot his wife while the two were
hunting deer, and authorities ruled her death accidental.' The News
Journal's account of the death was factually accurate, as Anderson
himself admitted.105 However, Anderson alleged that the arrangement of
the story portrayed him as a murderer.o The story contained a paragraph
about his filing for divorce days prior to the shooting between paragraphs
about the description of the shooting and the determination that it was an
accident. 07
After some of his defamation allegations were dismissed for
failure to meet Florida's two-year statute of limitations, Anderson
amended his complaint to add a new claim for false light invasion of
privacy. os This cause of action proceeded under Florida's four-year
statute of limitations for "unspecified torts." 109 A jury awarded Anderson
$18.28 million in compensatory damages on his false light claim."0 An
intermediate appellate court reversed the jury award, holding that
"[b]ecause [the false light] claim was not distinguishable in any material
respect from a libel claim, it was subject to the two-year statute of
limitations that applies to defamation actions."' 1' The Florida Supreme
Court, in rejecting false light as a whole, avoided addressing the merits
of Anderson's claim and approved the lower appellate court's
decision.1 2
103. Id. at 2-3.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2-3.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at 2. The compensatory damages were based on Anderson's claim that
as a result of the story, his paving company lost a "$50-million road contract."
Court Favors Expression in Rejecting "False Light", TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 3, 2008, at
19, available at 2008 WLNR 21119657.
111. Gannett Co. v. Anderson (Anderson 1), 947 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
112. Anderson v. Gannett Co. (Anderson II), 994 So. 2d at 1048 . See also
Lucy Morgan, "False Light" Lawsuit Rejected, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 24,
2008, at IB, available at 2008 WLNR 20292475. Anderson distributed a statement
to the media commenting that:
Today the Court shut the courthouse door to every Floridian
who is falsely accused by a newspaper when they publish
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D. Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co.
Exactly two months after the Florida Supreme Court's decisions
in Rapp and Anderson, another state court weighed in on the viability of
false light. In Missouri, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
embraced false light, reasoning:
As a result of the accessibility of the internet, the
barriers to generating publicity are quickly and
inexpensively surmounted. Moreover, the ethical
standards regarding the acceptability of certain
discourse have been diminished. Thus, as the
ability to do harm grows, we believe so must the
law's ability to protect the innocent. 113
In Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., Greg Meyerkord was listed as the
registrant for "www.alliwantforxmasisapsp.com," a fake blog (or "flog")
created by marketing company Zipatoni for Sony's handheld PSP
videogame console.114 The blog launched (and ended) in 2006, but
Meyerkord had left the company in 2003.H5 The backlash to the failed
viral marketing campaign included "concern, suspicion, and accusations
over the campaign and those associated with it, including Zipatoni and
words that are literally true but carefully crafted to include
thinly veiled accusations of wrongful conduct . . . . The Court
should be ashamed of itself for shielding the nation's largest
newspaper chain, Gannett, from being accountable for its
reckless actions.
Id.
113. Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
(emphasis added) (citing Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Ohio 2007)).
114. In 2006, the Zipatoni Company created a viral marketing campaign for
the Sony PlayStation Portable (PSP) that included a fake blog at
"www.alliwantforxmasisapsp.com." The site quickly drew criticism on the Web,
directed at both Zipatoni and Greg Meyerkord, a former Zipatoni employee who was
listed as the Web site's registrant. Meyerkord v. Zipatoni, 276 S.W.3d at 321. See
also Ellen P. Goodman, Symposium, Commercial Speech in an Age of Emerging
Technology and Corporate Scandal: Intellectual Property & Cyberlaw: Peer
Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58 S.C. L. REV. 683, 701 (2007)
("[A]dvertiser-created content designed to appear as a peer promotion ... should
constitute commercial speech and 'advertising or promotion' under the Lanham Act,
regardless of whether the promotion looks like it is peer-generated.").
115. Meyerkord, 276 S.W.3d at 321.
566 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9
Meyerkord."" 6 Meyerkord sued his former employer for false light,
alleging his privacy was invaded, reputation injured, and that "he has
suffered shame, embarrassment, humiliation, harassment, and mental
anguish."'"7 The trial court dismissed Meyerkord's claim based on
Zipatoni's argument that Missouri did not recognize false light, and
Meyerkord did not plead a defamation claim."
On appeal, Meyerkord was given the opportunity to amend his
complaint to plead the standard for false light as established by the
Missouri Court of Appeals1 l9 In deciding whether to recognize false
light, the court first looked to the treatment of the tort by other
jurisdictions.120 The Meyerkord court identified three common rationales
for the rejection of false light: overlap with defamation; increasing
tension with the First Amendment; and the judicially inefficient process
of courts considering two nearly identical claims for relief 21 The court
then addressed each argument.
As to the argument that false light and defamation are too much
alike, the Meyerkord court asserted that the two were "sufficiently
116. Id. See Kris Graft, Sony Screws Up: First the hardware woes. Now a
viral campaign for the PSP has backfired, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 19, 2006, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/print/innovate/content/dec2006/
id20061219 590177.htm. After the blog was exposed as fake, Sony put this
statement on the site:
Busted. Nailed. Snagged. As many of you have figured out
(maybe our speech was a little too funky fresh???), Peter isn't
a real hip-hop maven and this site was actually developed by
Sony. Guess we were trying to be just a little too clever. From
this point forward, we will just stick to making cool products,
and use this site to give you nothing but the facts on the PSP.
Id. However, in reaction to early criticism of the blog, a post to the site stated: "We
don't work for Sony. And for all you dissin' my skillz I'm down for a one on one
rap off or settling it street stylez if you feel me playa." Ed Kemp, Sony Ridiculed for
Setting Up Fake PSP Fan Website, MARKETING, Dec. 20, 2006, at 1, available at
2006 WLNR 22286201. The Web site was taken down in December 2006, but a
British site maintains a screenshot of the first page of the blog. UK Resistance
screenshot of www.alliwantforxmasisapsp.com, http://www.ukresistance.co.uk
/sonylieblog/default.aspx.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2011).
117. Meyerkord, 276 S.W.3d at 322.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 326.
120. Id. at 323-24.
121. Id. at 324.
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distinguishable" based on the different interests protected (injury to one's
right to be let alone versus injury to reputation).122 It also stated that
"where the issue is truth or falsity, the marketplace of ideas provides a
forum where the answer can be found, while in privacy cases, resort to
the marketplace merely accentuates the injury."l 23
The Meyerkord court held that First Amendment concerns could
be assuaged by requiring proof of actual malice for all cases, regardless
of the plaintiffs status as a public or private figure.124 This approach,
according to the court, "strikes the best balance between allowing false
light claims and protecting First Amendment rights."1 2 5 Requiring proof
of actual malice also "alleviate[s] some of the concerns regarding judicial
economy.,,126 The court concluded that the facts of the
"www.alliwantforxmasisapsp.com" fiasco were just right to prompt a
Missouri decision regarding false light, especially considering the
Internet's increased potential for harm to "the innocent."l27
III. DANGER AHEAD: THE POTENTIAL FOR FALSE LIGHT TO DIM THE
LIGHTS ON FREE SPEECH
Privacy law is a relatively new area of the common law, and as
Professors Don R. Pember and Dwight L. Teeter Jr. quipped a quarter
century ago, "[t]o say that the law of privacy is not a great hallmark of
122. Id. On the other hand, Washington University Professor Neil Richards
told Missouri Lawyers Weekly that "[t]here isn't a strong argument for why we
should resuscitate false light when defamation covers the main areas of reputation . .
. . False light is vague and any tort that tries to remedy statements made about
someone raises a danger to free speech." Angela Riley, Internet Necessitates "False
Light" Protection, Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Says, MO. LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Dec. 29, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 25932967. But Meyerkord's
attorney, Steven Rineberg, argued that the distinguishing feature "'between false
light and defamation is that in a false light case the statement doesn't need to be
defamatory ... . Just [Meyerkord] being listed as a registrant isn't defamation. The
false light was how the public views him afterward where his privacy is invaded."'
Id.
123. Meyerkord, 276 S.W.3d at 325 (citing West v. Media Gen. Convergence,
Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tenn. 2001)).
124. Id. at 325.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
logic and clarity in American law is to indulge in egregious
understatement."l 2 8 Warren and Brandeis' assertion of a right to privacy
was considered by courts for decades, but Prosser's articulation of the
four privacy torts and their subsequent inclusion in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts put these causes of action on the fast-track to
widespread judicial acceptance. In some cases, through mere repetition,
these torts, especially false light, took hold in American jurisprudence
without adequate inquiry into their necessity or actual basis in case law.
The result is a cause of action - false light - that is hard to define,
duplicative of defamation, and most concerning, threatens speech. False
light's rate of appearance in published court decisions has also increased
dramatically over the years, making the issue all the more important to
the press.
Consider defamation law, an area that is as well-defined as
possiblel29 with case law that for nearly fifty years has been applied with
the First Amendment lens established in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan30 as protection for speech. The usefulness of defamation is
perhaps best illustrated by the willingness of courts to freely borrow
from its concepts in false light cases. Why borrow from an established
body of law to patch together an alternative tort that rarely, if ever,
redresses a wrong that cannot be remedied by a defamation claim?' 3 '
The strongest argument of false light proponents is that false
light remedies harm resulting from non-defamatory falsehoods. Put
another way, false light provides redress for truthful statements that cast
128. Don R. Pember & Dwight L. Tweeter Jr., Privacy and the Press Since
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REV. 57, 57 (1975).
129. See, e.g., Lake, supra note 20, at 626-27 ("Defamation law in the United
States consists of complex rules that have evolved over decades as courts and
legislatures have sought to accommodate the varied interests of speakers, recipients
of information, and persons discussed.").
130. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
131. Professor Kalven noted that "[t]he technical complexity of the law of
defamation, which has shown remarkable stamina in the teeth of centuries of acid
criticism, may reflect one useful strategy for a legal system forced against its
ultimate better judgment to deal with dignitary harms." He also worried, more than
40 years ago, of privacy's potential to expand: "[I]t would be a notable thing if the
right of privacy, having, as it were, failed in three-quarters of a century to amount to
anything at home, went forth to take over the traditional torts of libel and slander."
Kalven, supra note 31, at 341.
568 [Vol. 9
2011] WHEN THE TRUTH ISN'T GOOD ENOUGH 569
the plaintiff in a false light. Injecting the word "truthful" into the debate
can, and should, raise constitutional red flags. Further, the scenarios used
by Prosser and most recently the Florida Supreme Court in Rapp involve
the juxtaposition of images with unrelated news content. For example, a
photo of a cab driver is "truthful" in that it is an accurate depiction of
that driver. An accompanying story about unethical fare practices would
by itself be "truthful" as well. False light proponents argue that while the
content is truthful, the overall impression is false. That analogy makes
sense for images and unrelated content scenarios, but what about the
Anderson case? A newspaper was hit with an $18-million false light
verdict based on what all parties agreed was entirely truthful reporting.
Using images and unrelated content scenarios to extend false light to
truthful reporting is flawed logic.
The solution to this problem - the justifiable need to protect
innocent subjects of stock photos who end up associated with negative
stories versus the First Amendment dangers of suppressing truthful
reporting - lies within existing law. As Professor Kelso has argued,
many of the cases Prosser relies upon to support his assertion of the
existence of the false light tort can almost uniformly be addressed by
other causes of action.13 In the images and unrelated content scenario,
the remedy is a misappropriation of likeness action. This tort could also
have addressed Meyerkord's wrong had he argued that the
132. Kelso, supra note 46, at 807. Professor Kelso concluded:
The core of the cause of action under this analysis is not that
the defendant has falsely created the impression that the
plaintiff is somehow connected to the subject matter of the
article, but the misappropriation of the plaintiffs picture for
commercial purposes . . . the cases which Prosser cites [for the
proposition of false light] are more consistent with this
misappropriation analysis than with Prosser's suggested false
light tort.
Id. See also Peay v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (approving
libel and invasion of privacy claims by a cab driver whose photo was used in a
Saturday Evening Post story about "dishonest" drivers) and Leverton v. Curtis
Publ'g Co., 192 F.2d 974, 974-78 (3d Cir. 1951) (affirming an invasion of privacy
claim where the photo of a girl who was innocently struck by a car was used in
conjunction with a story about "pedestrian carelessness").
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misappropriation of his name was an invasion of privacy.1 33 Or, as the
Florida Supreme Court suggested, defamation by implication could
suffice in these instances. 13 4
This leaves the Anderson scenario - what if a news story or
broadcast is truthful but this truthful information is allegedly arranged in
such a way that creates a false light? Exposing the press to liability in
situations such as these is simply too big of a gamble to take with First
Amendment freedoms. First, the pace of the modern newsroom
(especially in the age of the Internet) dictates quick decision-making.
The process of intentionally choosing a photo and then placing it with an
unrelated and often controversial story is one in which an editor would
probably have a reasonable opportunity to assess the potential for
backlash from the photo subject. In contrast, the process of determining
whether the subtle arrangement of sentences in a truthful story might be
"highly offensive to the reasonable person"135 is a near-impossible task
and to charge the press with doing so would impermissibly violate the
First Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its acceptance by a majority of states, false light remains
the most controversial and least understood aspect of invasion of
privacy.136 Legislatures and judges around the country have struggled
with this issue since the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the false light
tort more than 40 years ago but at that time failed to establish the
constitutional parameters and the necessary protections for free speech in
a society that values the marketplace of ideas and free-wheeling
debate. 131
133. See, e.g., Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D.
Minn. 2005) (holding that an anti-abortion activist who registered domain names
with names and nicknames of pro-choice advocates misappropriated their names for
his own benefit).
134. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
136. Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 898 (Colo. 2002) (quoting
Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994)).
137. See, e.g., John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in 29 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 379, 409 (1952). As Milton eloquently stated:
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As a result, false light claims threaten fundamental First
Amendment freedoms where journalists print truthful information about
matters of public concern. In these cases, reporters can be punished for
writing stories that would likely be protected under the constitutional
guarantees provided by libel law but are not mandatory under many
states' false light tort statutes or court opinions.
In addition to strong First Amendment grounds, there are other
important reasons for courts around the country to reconsider the
constitutionality and viability of false light claims. First, the claim is
elusive, amorphous, confusing, and controversial. Second, the tort is a
waste of judicial resources, as it requires courts to consider two claims,
defamation and false light, for the same relief. Third, false light torts lack
the procedural safeguards found in defamation law, thereby increasing
the tension between free speech and tort law. Finally, false light lawsuits
are intended to protect against emotional harm and potentially require
journalists to predict how the subject of the story or the readers will
interpret the truth.
The tort of false light is inconsistent with First Amendment
values and historic protections for journalists. False light plaintiffs
should not be allowed to punish speech that is rightfully protected by the
First Amendment simply because their feelings get hurt. Unfortunately,
sometimes the truth hurts. But that is no excuse to trample on America's
longstanding commitment to a free press.
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by
licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse,
in a free and open encounter?
Id. See also W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace ofldeas,
73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q., 40 (Spring 1996) ("No metaphor is more deeply
entrenched in the language of First Amendment jurisprudence than the 'marketplace
of ideas."').

